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In the following paper I focus on some rhetorical practices that are 
used by interactants in arguments with others. I identify argument 
criteria interactants refer to and describe how they use them as 
interactional resources for their argumentation. My considerations 
are part of a broader study of conversational rhetoric in problem 
oriented and conflict interaction, conducted at the Institute for Ger-
man Language in Mannheim, Germany (see Kallmeyer 1996). The 
main goal of this project is the analysis and description of interac-
tive practices under a functional rhetorical perspective which is de-
rived from an ethnomethodological approach to the study of con-
versation. Ethnomethodologists have so far mainly looked at the 
organizational order of interaction (see Garfinkel & Sacks 1970), 
we also investigate on forms of interactive influence and interactive 
effects of the participants’ interactive work.
In order to describe a wide range of rhetorical practices we 
take into account various dimensions of interaction that have been 
explicated by Kallmeyer and Schütze in a theory of the construc-
tion of interaction (Kallmeyer & Schütze 1976). According to this 
theory interactants have to carry out their conversation by simulta-
neously dealing with different dimensions of interactional organi-
zation (listed in figure 1).
Organizational structure of talk 
Thematical organization 
Activity organization 
Identity and relationship construction 
Modality construction 
Reciprocity organization
Figure 1 Dimensions o f interaction construction
Concerning rhetorical practices, there are for example different 
practices of cooperation and constraint that are required due to the 
organizational structures of talk, or practices of social positioning 
of the participants due to identity and relationship construction, or 
practices of setting and blocking perspectives due to reciprocity de-
mands.
The context of my argumentation analysis is the dimension of 
thematical organization in problem and conflict interaction. Argu-
mentation as a whole is seen then as one rhetorical practice for 
thematical clarification amongst other patterns such as for example 
story telling, reports, or portraying (see Kallmeyer & Schütze 
1978). Thus, first I had to analyze argumentation as a whole and to 
work out the conditions under which argumentation is established 
and carried out in interaction.
Briefly put, interactants begin an argumentation when their 
thematical exchange runs into a deficit. Then they have to explain 
and give reasons. Typical deficits include dissent or uncertainty. 
Argumentation, then, is an interactive pattern for explaining a posi-
tion and for locally clarifying the deficit and for then integrating 
the solution of the deficit into the „normal“ course of the current in-
teraction. Formally characterized, argumentation has a three part 
structure consisting of initiating, carrying out and reintegration.
I do not want to specify the difficulties of the empirical analy-
sis of the argumentation pattern but to focus on argumentative 
relevances that interactants deal with during their argumentation. In 
the course of that I will point out resources of argumentation which 
are made relevant from the participants themselves in rhetorical ar-
gument practices.
Before presenting these resources and practices I will briefly 
explain the methodology that we have used. First of all, I defined 
segments of argumentation in about sixty video- or audiotaped and 
transcribed conversations from a wide range of problem and con-
flict interaction situations such as mediation talk, mother-daughter- 
or partner-conflict talk, counselling sessions, TV-discussions, and 
so on.429 Within these segments I looked for either explicit com-
plaints or particularly expanded formulations produced by the 
interactants. These activities were analyzed in a pragma-semantic 
perspective for criteria that the participants themselves make rele-
vant as argument criteria. They complain about incorrect argumen-
tation moves of their respective partners, or otherwise characterize 
some of their own activities as particularly important. In this fash-
ion, I use the participants’ perspective in my methodical approach.
In this fashion, I could identify two groups of criteria or re-
sources of argumentation: one group which reflects certain condi-
tions and organizational constraints of conversational argument, 
and another group where the interactants exchange thematical 
moves in different modality formats as arguments.
I will now present the criteria in both groups in a synoptical 
way, and explain them and their relation to the different dimensions 
of interaction. I will thereby shortly indicate how interactants use 
these criteria as resources to construct rhetorical practices for their 
argumentation. After that I will give some examples of some of 
these practices, their formats, linguistics, and their positive or prob-
lematic interactive effects.
The first group, which reflects certain conditions and organiza-
tional requirements of conversational argumentation, contains the 
following five criteria:
(1) Interactants demonstrate thematical consistency and consistency 
of their utterances, they check it, or they complain about inconsis-
tencies of their partners’ argumentation. Consistency refers to con-
tradictions and (in)coherencies and is seen both, locally and glob-
ally in the course of argumentation. Dealing with consistency is 
relevant in the dimension of thematical organization.
(2) Interactants demand interactional relevance of the partners’ ac-
tivity, or they deny it. Relevance is a very strong and often-used ar-
gument. Interactants always organize the course of their mutual ar-
gumentation by referring to relevance. Relevance as a criterion or 
an argumentative rhetorical resource belongs to the dimension of 
activity organization (which includes a wide range Of activities 
from a single speech act to the global activity tasks, such as for ex-
ample, counselling or mediating).
(3) Another criterion operates in the same dimension of activity or-
ganization: argumentants make sure that their activities are appro-
priate and valid in relation to the global activity tasks and to the 
thematic development oft the argumentation. Otherwise they 
critizise the inappropriateness and invalidity of the partners’ argu-
ment.
(4) Argumentants also use qualities of identity as argument criteria.
429 The corpus reperesents a selection from the corpora of the Institute for German Language, which include some hundred natural 
conversations.
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One important criterion then is, whether the partners are competent 
to deal with the discussed topics or not. In argumentation the part-
ners demonstrate their competence, for example, by deriving it 
from personal experience, or from professional knowledge; they at-
tribute competence to their partners or they deny their partners’ 
competence. Discussions of the respective partners’ competence 
operates in the dimension of identity and relationship construction 
in interaction.
(5) Also in this dimension, a further criterion operates which 
argumentants take into consideration: argumentative integrity. 
Interactants demonstrate in argumentation that they are trustworthy 
and authentic, that they pay attention to the partners’ interactive 
rights and so on. Or they critizise their partners for ignoring such 
integrity demands.
The second group of argument criteria is at the heart of argumenta-
tion. Interactants exchange thematical activities in different modal-
ity formats as arguments. This group of interactive arguments deals 
with epistemic or deontic modes and therefore operates in the inter-
active dimension of modality construction.
(6) Primarily, argumentants deal with /actuality. They claim what 
they are saying as real or factual. And they sometimes even demon-
strate the factuality of their assertions. Otherwise they also deny 
factuality of their partners’ assertion. And they do so in an
epistemic mode of objectivity.
(7) In contrast to the presentation of objectivity argumentants also 
claim a subjective epistemic mode. They characterize what they are 
saying as subjective, for example, as their personal conviction.
They also formulate assumptions and demand their partners’ as-
sumptions.
(8) And, finally, argumentants deal in a deontic mode with 
normativity: while arguing they appeal to social norms, they esti-
mate their own or their partners’ arguments in relation to such 
norms, or they put in a normative claim regarding their partners’ 
activities.
The criteria and rhetorical practices that I have mentioned in this 
synoptical fashion reveal the fundamental characteristics of discur-
sive argumentation. These are not meant as exclusive categories; 
for example, competence sometimes interferes with integrity or 
with relevance in such a way that critizising disintegrity also aims 
at denying competence, or the alleged lack of competence also 
makes an activity irrelevant - language use is always ambi- or even 
polyvalent. But in analyzing argumentative discourses you will 
regularily find these criteria and practices (listed in figure 2) and 
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Figure 2 Argument criteria and rhetorical practices
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In a discourse analytic perspective you have to bear in mind, how-
ever, that argumentants do not really work out what is true or right. 
None of the above categories has any argumentative ontological 
state. Argumentants otherwise always do interactively negotiate 
what is fact, which norm is right, what is relevant for them and so 
on. Interactively valid is only what argumentants accept by arguing 
interactively (see Deppermann 1997, Chs. 1.2.5 and III.4).
In the following section I will shortly present two of the rhetor-
ical practices of argumentation. As a first rhetorical practice I will 
explain denying competence. Interactants mutually have to attribute 
competence for the global tasks of their interaction (see Nothdurft 
1994). Competence is on the one hand a logically necessary condi-
tion, but on the other hand locally negotiable in detail by the 
interactants. To demonstrate competence provides validity to the 
discursive activities while denying competence withdraws trust in 
the partners’ utterances. By dealing with the criterion of compe-
tence speakers claim validity, make the partners’ claims problem-
atic, or even reject them. Competence is seldom a central focus in 
argumentation but it is an important criterion forjudging. Dealing 
with competence therefore is a referring and a pivotal activity: it re-
fers to an activity of the speaker or his partners, and it regularily 
paves the way for the speaker’s following own activities.
Denying competence refers to personal qualities like age, job, 
social role, discursive abilities, and so on. Sometimes interactants 
critizise problematic, deficient, or irrelevant competences of their 
partners, sometimes they say that their partners have no compe-
tence at ail. Problematic or even „wrong“ could be a competence 
which is related to personal interest (for example, if a manager of 
the tobacco industry defines the dangers of smoking cigarettes; for 
the other qualities of incompetence as deficient, irrelevant or not 
existing you may simply build examples of your own.
A denial of competence is uttered when speakers explicitly re-
serve some competence only for their own, or if the partner’s argu-
ments implicitly make claims for competence. The rhetorical prac-
tice of denying competence is rather seldom in argumentation 
because it is a face-threatening activity. But sometimes in interac-
tions before an audience, denying competence makes sense for the 
critic as a demonstrative act directed to the audience.
Denying competence as an argument practice is a powerful re-
source to block the partner’s move and to establish one’s own ac-
tivities. It is dysfunctional if the face-threatening aspect overwrites 
the focal interactive tasks.
As a second example I will explain a practice by which the 
speaker claims a particular epistemic modality for his own activi-
ties: claiming /actuality. In argumentation the common view on re-
ality is fragile, there is dissent or uncertainty between the partners. 
Argumentants then try to reestablish a common perspective by 
making assertions with which they try to bring about acceptance by 
their partners. Assertions and their acceptance do oblige the 
interactants then to a common view.
Presupposing the possibility of such an agreement is a central 
premise for being able to interact at all. The interactive power of 
the epistemic mode of factuality is grounded in the assumption that 
other persons are able to perceive things like I do. Argumentants 
deal with this, but you have to notice that reality also is a discur-
sively negotiable entity and not an objective entity that one can 
simply refer to.
The overwhelming part of argument activities in discourse 
deals with claiming factuality. Speakers regularily use agreements 
about aspects of reality to make clear and to consolidate their own 
argumentative positions or otherwise to undermine the partner s 
position. The relations of all assertions thereby build up a network 
of a global position, they help to support other assertions and as a 
whole they make the discursive presentation itself scrutinizable, for 
example, via the probe of coherence and contradiction.
By claiming factuality the interactants try to interactively es-
tablish the validity of propositions and to push through their inter-
est. Claiming factuality is normally realized by existential proposi-
tions. Such utterances are often self-evident and interactively 
ratified or even accepted in an unproblematic way. However, at the 
end of longer contributions, especially as conclusions, they are of-
ten rejected by partners because they claim global positions.
Linguistically, the factuality mode is established by the indica-
tive sentence mode. Lexically, you often find markers like „in-
deed“, „really“, or „literally” and so on. Prominent also are some 
prosodic features which range from unmarked self-evidence to 
marking certainty by accent, pitch, and rhythm.
Claiming factuality always establishes the necessity to deal 
with it. Partners are forced to react either by ratifying or accepting, 
or by rejecting it. Accepting on the one hand then obliges partners 
for the further discourse while rejecting leads to a - normally 
dispreferred -expansion.
The interactive constraint to deal with this practice by ratify-
ing, accepting or rejecting produces its own rhetorical power: Every 
claim stabilizes an argumentative position of the respective 
speaker. With it, aspects of a supposed reality are interactively pub-
licized and asserted, and the inferential implications produce local 
and global effects. But the speaker himself is also bound by his or 
her own statements, and, besides, such assertions and their respec-
tive global position always are threatened by contradicting claims 
of their partners.
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